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A Merry-Go-Round of Metal and Manipulation: 
Toward a New Framework for Commodity 
Exchange Self-Regulation 
Samuel D. Posnick* 
Twenty-three-year-old Tyler Clay, a former forklift driver 
for a Goldman Sachs-owned aluminum warehouse, described 
the process as a “merry-go-round of metal.”1 A fleet of trucks 
would shuffle thousands of pounds of aluminum from one De-
troit warehouse to another a few miles away, only to repeat the 
circuit two to three times a day, day after day.2 But why? The 
simple answer: money. Goldman Sachs and other financial 
holding companies (FHCs) were able to artificially increase the 
price of physical aluminum deliverable in the United States by 
lengthening its storage time.3 The benefits were multifold for 
the financial institutions, as they received rent payments for 
storing the metal in their warehouses as well as increased the 
value of proprietary physical aluminum and aluminum-related 
financial instruments.4 The practice, meanwhile, was estimated 
to cost American consumers more than $5 billion over three 
years because manufacturers of products such as soda and beer 
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2016, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. 2012, 
University of Colorado–Boulder. I owe enormous thanks to Professor Daniel 
Schwarcz, Professor David Gross, Emily Booth, Jeff Simard, Jerome Borden, 
and Laura Farley for helpful comments. I also want to thank my friends and 
family, especially my adorable Labrador Lucy, for their unwavering support 
and understanding. Copyright © 2015 by Samuel D. Posnick.  
 1. David Kocieniewski, A Shuffle of Aluminum, but to Banks, Pure Gold, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/business/a 
-shuffle-of-aluminum-but-to-banks-pure-gold.html. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id.; see infra Part I.C (detailing the specifics of the Goldman Sachs 
scheme). 
 4. See Matt Taibbi, The Vampire Squid Strikes Again: The Mega Banks’ 
Most Devious Scam Yet, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.rolling 
stone.com/politics/news/the-vampire-squid-strikes-again-the-mega-banks-most 
-devious-scam-yet-20140212; infra Part I.C (detailing, for example, the finan-
cial benefits of the Goldman Sachs scheme). 
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passed on their increased aluminum costs to customers.5 Reve-
lation of the scheme resulted in severe backlash, including in-
vestigations,6 lawsuits,7 and a congressional hearing.8  
FHCs are legally permitted to engage in physical commodi-
ties activities, such as owning aluminum warehouses and trad-
ing physical aluminum, subject to ongoing regulation by the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Board).9 
The Board vowed to review its regulation of FHCs’ “commodity-
related activities”10 and issued an Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking in January 2014.11 FHCs, however, are merely the 
latest to engage in a type of misconduct that spans the history 
of commodities exchanges.12 The threat of market manipulation 
remains ever-present. Large commodities traders, for example, 
have begun to look more like banking institutions while escap-
ing the associated regulatory scrutiny.13 As such, they present 
 
 5. Kocieniewski, supra note 1. 
 6. E.g., Susan Thomas, IOSCO Surveys Warehouse Impact on Commodi-
ty Derivatives Market, REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2014/08/08/regulations-commodities-iosco-idUSL6N0QE3LF20140808. 
 7. See Andrew Harris, Goldman Sachs Aluminum Antitrust Suits 
Shipped to NYC, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2013-12-16/goldman-sachs-aluminum-antitrust-suits-shipped-to-nyc  
.html. These lawsuits were eventually dismissed. Wall Street Banks Get Rid of 
Aluminum Price Fixing Suits, ZACKS (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.zacks.com/ 
stock/news/145836/Wall-Street-Banks-Get-Rid-of-Aluminum-Price-Fixing 
-Suits. 
 8. Regulating Financial Holding Companies and Physical Commodities: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Prot. of the S. Comm. 
on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. (2014) [hereinafter Hear-
ing]. 
 9. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (2012); infra Parts I.A, I.C (detailing, re-
spectively, the legal and regulatory environment of FHCs and the specifics of 
the Goldman Sachs case). 
 10. Hearing, supra note 8, at 36–37 (statement of Michael S. Gibson, Di-
rector, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System).  
 11. Complementary Activities, Merchant Banking Activities, and Other 
Activities of Financial Holding Companies Related to Physical Commodities, 
79 Fed. Reg. 3329 (advanced notice given Jan. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Commod-
ities ANPR]; see also Kate Davidson, Yellen: Fed To Issue Bank Commodity 
Rules This Year, WALL ST. J. ECON. BLOG (Feb. 25, 2015, 11:16 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/02/25/yellen-fed-to-issue-bank-commodity 
-rules-this-year (“[T]he Fed plans to propose new rules this year.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commodity 
Exchanges: The Case of Market Manipulation, 38 J.L. & ECON. 141, 165–69 
(1995) [hereinafter Self-Regulation] (discussing the manipulation of grain and 
provisions markets between 1865 and 1922).  
 13. Lina Khan, The Folks Who Sell Your Corn Flakes Are Acting Like 
Goldman Sachs—and That Should Worry You, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 11, 
2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114577/commodities-trading-hedge 
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similar (if not greater) hazards to the efficiency and integrity of 
commodities markets as FHCs.14 
Although market manipulation involves the confluence of 
numerous different factors, commodities exchanges—providers 
of environments for commodities futures trading activities15—
represent a (sometimes unwitting) linchpin in manipulation 
schemes.16 These organizations create their own rules defining 
proper futures trading practices,17 subject to deferential Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) oversight.18 While 
exchanges used to be member owned, there has been a recent 
trend toward demutualization: the conversion to a publicly 
traded, shareholder-owned company. 19  This structural shift 
raises potential conflicts of interest, as exchanges may be in-
centivized to create rules that maximize their profits rather 
than maintain the integrity and efficiency of markets.20 
This Note offers a solution to the current self-regulatory 
 
-funds-spook-wall-st-banks (“Over the last decade, some of the world’s biggest 
traditional traders in grains, oil, and metals have quietly taken on many at-
tributes of banks—running billion-dollar hedge funds, launching private equi-
ty arms, and selling derivatives to clients.”).  
 14. See id. (“These [financial] businesses enable trading firms to tie up 
large sums of money in bets and profit off insider information.”). 
 15. See, e.g., About Us, LONDON METAL EXCHANGE, http://www.lme.com/ 
about-us (last visited Oct. 12, 2015). The terms “commodity exchange” and “fu-
tures exchange” are often used interchangeably, as commodities futures con-
tracts are a subset of the futures contract universe. See infra note 47 (defining 
“futures exchange” and “futures contract”). Because this Note specifically fo-
cuses on commodities trading activities, it will generally use the term “com-
modity exchange.”  
 16. See infra Parts I.C, II.A (detailing, respectively, the specifics of the 
Goldman Sachs scheme and the flawed assumptions underlying current self-
regulatory systems). 
 17. See, e.g., LONDON METAL EXCH., LONDON METAL EXCHANGE RULES & 
REGULATIONS (2014), https://www.lme.com/~/media/Files/Regulation/Rule 
book/Full%20Rulebook/Rulebook%20as%20of%20September%202014.pdf; see 
also infra Part I.B (discussing exchange regulation). 
 18. See infra text accompanying note 49. The CFTC has not shown the 
same willingness to reexamine commodity exchange regulation as has the 
Board with FHCs’ commodities activities. Compare Commodities ANPR, supra 
note 11 (inviting public comment on issues related to FHCs’ commodities ac-
tivities), with Silla Brush, Senate Democrats Urge CFTC Review of LME Alu-
minum Trading, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 27, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2014-09-26/senate-democrats-urge-cftc-review-of-lme-aluminum 
-trading (reporting that members of Congress have implored the CFTC to “in-
vestigate whether [exchange] rules sufficiently protect against conflicts of in-
terest between firms’ trading and warehouse operations”). 
 19. See infra Part I.B (discussing the shift in exchange ownership struc-
ture). 
 20. See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the effects of the shift in exchange 
ownership structure). 
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framework of commodities exchanges that facilitates market 
manipulation. It does not engage in the debate over whether 
FHCs should be allowed to engage in commodity-related activi-
ties.21 Rather, this Note contends that commodities exchanges 
need to be better regulated. Subsection I examines the conver-
gence of banking, commerce, and commodity exchange regula-
tion that resulted in the recent manipulation of markets. Sub-
section II analyzes the current model of self-regulation, 
ultimately arguing that commodities exchanges’ self-
promulgated rules do not offer enough protection against mar-
ket manipulation. Subsection III draws from the strengths of 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) model for 
establishing financial accounting standards and proposes dele-
gating authority for commodity exchange rule promulgation to 
a new, similarly-structured entity. 
I.  BANKING, COMMERCE, AND EXCHANGE 
DEMUTUALIZATION: A PATH TO COMMODITY MARKET 
MANIPULATION   
Although FHCs are not the only potential manipulators of 
commodities markets, their involvement in these markets 
brought new light to the issue. Thus, it is helpful to understand 
the interplay between FHCs’ commodities activities and com-
modity exchange self-regulation before assessing possible 
changes to such regulation. Section A frames the legal land-
scape for the general separation of banking and commerce and 
FHCs’ reaction to the blurring of the line. Section B outlines 
the shifting structure of exchanges. Section C brings the two 
together in describing how Goldman Sachs was able to gain 
monopoly power with respect to the United States aluminum 
market. 
A. THE INTEGRATION OF BANKING AND COMMERCE 
The fundamental principle of the separation of banking 
and commerce underlies the complex regulatory regime sur-
rounding United States banks and bank holding companies 
(BHCs).22 Yet, it was somewhat abandoned in recent years, par-
 
 21. For such a debate, see Commodities ANPR, supra note 11 (encourag-
ing public debate over FHC involvement in commodities markets). 
 22. See Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Com-
merce, and Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 268 (2013); Bernard Shull, 
The Separation of Banking and Commerce in the United States: An Examina-
tion of the Principal Issues, 8 FIN. MKTS. INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 1, 1 
(1999). 
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ticularly following the 2008 financial crisis. Subsection 1 out-
lines the statutory changes that gave rise to the mixing of 
banking and commerce, while Subsection 2 discusses FHCs’ 
commodities businesses.  
1. The Bank Holding Company Act and the Graham-Leach- 
Bliley Amendments 
The Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA) explicitly invokes 
the separation of banking and commerce principle, as it gener-
ally restricts BHCs—companies that own or control national 
banks—from engaging in any business activities other than 
banking and managing banks.23 There are clear rationales for 
separating banking from purely commercial business activities, 
including safety and soundness risks to federally insured de-
pository institutions, potential conflicts of interest between 
banks and their commercial affiliates, and “excessive concen-
tration of economic—and ultimately political—power in the 
hands of large financial-industrial conglomerates.”24  
Nonetheless, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA) 
amended the BHCA and created a new FHC structure that 
opened the door for the mixing of banking and commerce.25 The 
statute states that an FHC may “engage in any activity, and 
may acquire and retain the shares of any company engaged in 
any activity,” that the Board determines “(A) to be financial in 
nature or incidental to such financial activity; or (B) is comple-
mentary to a financial activity.”26  
As an activity that is “financial in nature,” the so-called 
“merchant banking” authority allows an FHC to acquire full 
ownership in a purely commercial enterprise,27 provided the 
 
 23. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2012). Moreover, BHCs must register with the 
Board and face extensive regulation and supervision. See id. § 1844(a)–(b); cf. 
Robert Schroeder, Goldman, Morgan To Become Holding Companies, 
MARKETWATCH (Sept. 21, 2008), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/goldman 
-sachs-morgan-stanley-to-become-bank-holding-companies (describing “greater 
scrutiny by regulators and new capital requirements” as the “price” of becom-
ing a BHC). 
 24. Omarova, supra note 22, at 275–76. For a general discussion of the 
potential policy implications of combining banking and commercial activities, 
see id. at 333–55. 
 25. Financial Services Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act, Pub. L. 
No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended throughout 12 
U.S.C.); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1841(p) (2012) (defining “financial holding compa-
ny”); id. § 1843(l)(1) (listing the requirements to be categorized as an FHC). 
 26. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1). 
 27. Id. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (listing five requirements for an FHC’s investment 
in a commercial enterprise). 
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principal purpose of the investment remains purely financial—
to make a profit on the eventual disposition of its ownership 
stake—as opposed to operational—to conduct the non-financial 
business of the portfolio company.28 In other words, an FHC’s 
investment in a commercial firm pursuant to its merchant 
banking powers must be passive rather than active. 
The GLBA also grants FHCs the power to engage in com-
mercial activities that are not financial in nature so long as 
they are “complementary” to a financial activity.29 An FHC ap-
plies for the Board’s approval of such an activity by filing a 
written notice.30 In the notice, the FHC must describe the com-
mercial activity, its relation to a financial activity, and the ex-
pected public benefits of engaging in the activity, among other 
items.31 The Board then determines whether the proposed ac-
tivity’s potential public benefits outweigh its potential negative 
effects.32 Given these new statutory avenues to pursue commer-
cial interests, Subsection 2 discusses the trajectory of FHCs’ 
commodities operations. 
2. The Rise of Banking and Commerce 
FHCs used the GLBA amendments to build physical com-
modities businesses. Although the trading of commodity-
related financial instruments has never raised any legal issues 
under the BHCA, FHCs are generally prohibited from trading 
in the physical commodities underlying the derivative securi-
ties, even after the GLBA amendments.33 The Board, nonethe-
less, used its complementary activities authority under the 
GLBA to approve the trading of physical commodities by FHCs, 
 
 28. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 66 Fed. Reg. 
8466, 8469 (Jan. 31, 2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225 (2015)); see Omarova, 
supra note 22, at 281–84. The Board, for example, prohibits FHCs from being 
involved in the routine management or operation of its portfolio companies. 12 
C.F.R. § 225.171. 
 29. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B). 
 30. 12 C.F.R. § 225.89(a) (requiring written notice if the FHC is to obtain 
more than a five percent stake in a commercial firm’s voting securities). 
 31. Id. § 225.89(a)(1)–(6). 
 32. Id. § 225.89(b). In addition to the merchant banking and complemen-
tary activity avenues, the GLBA contains a special grandfathering provision 
that specifically permits certain FHCs to engage in commodities activities. See 
12 U.S.C. § 1843(o); see also Hearing, supra note 8, at 9–11 (discussing the 
ambiguity as to whether the grandfathering provision applies to FHCs pur-
chasing assets in either existing or new commodities markets). However, 
FHCs have yet to widely utilize this provision. See Omarova, supra note 22, at 
289–90. 
 33. See Omarova, supra note 22, at 301. 
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finding that such activities “flowed” from FHCs’ legitimate fi-
nancial activities, made FHCs more competitive with other fi-
nancial institutions not subject to regulatory restrictions on 
physical commodities transactions, and allowed FHCs to pro-
vide clients with a full range of commodity-related services in a 
more efficient manner.34 
Although several FHCs entered physical commodities 
markets during the years preceding the 2008 financial crisis, 
three dominant players—Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase & 
Co. (JPMC), and Morgan Stanley—emerged following it.35 All 
three would continue to grow their physical commodities busi-
nesses during the years after the height of the crisis.36 All three 
would also later be accused of manipulating various commodi-
ties markets.37 Even if FHCs were to be severely restricted in 
their commodity-related activities, other, less-regulated institu-
 
 34. See, e.g., Citigroup Inc., Order Approving Notice To Engage in Activi-
ties Complementary to a Financial Activity, 89 FED. RES. BULL. 508, 509 
(2003). The Board also placed several conditions on FHCs’ commodities trad-
ing businesses. See, e.g., id. at 510 (stating that Citigroup was not “authorized 
to (i) [o]wn, operate, or invest in facilities for the extraction, transportation, 
storage, or distribution of commodities; or (ii) [p]rocess, refine, or otherwise 
alter commodities” (emphasis added)); see also JPMorgan Chase & Co., Order 
Approving Notice To Engage in Activities Complementary to a Financial Activ-
ity, 92 FED. RES. BULL. C57, C58 (2006) (placing the same conditions on JP 
Morgan Chase). 
 35. Omarova, supra note 22, at 310. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, 
two previously independent investment banks, were hastily approved to be-
come FHCs in 2008 as part of the effort to bolster public confidence in the fi-
nancial system. See Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., Order Approving Formation of 
Bank Holding Companies, 94 FED. RES. BULL. C101, C103 (2008), 2008 WL 
7861871; Morgan Stanley, Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding Com-
panies and Notice To Engage in Certain Nonbanking Activities, 94 FED. RES. 
BULL. C103, C106 (2008), 2008 WL 7861872. 
 36. See Omarova, supra note 22, at 310–33. The recent regulatory and po-
litical scrutiny of FHCs’ physical commodities activities, however, has some-
what reversed that trend. Compare Josephine Mason, Exclusive: Goldman 
Puts Metro Metals Warehousing Unit Up for Sale, REUTERS (May 20, 2014), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/21/us-goldman-metals-sale-idUSBREA 
4J0NO20140521 (reporting Goldman Sachs’s attempt to scale down its physi-
cal commodities business), and Dmitry Zhdannikov & Silvia Antonioli, JP 
Morgan Sells Commodity Arm to Mercuria for $800 Million: Sources, REUTERS 
(Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/06/us-mercuria-jpmor 
gan-idUSKCN0HV0TJ20141006 (reporting JPMC’s exit from physical com-
modities markets), with Lauren Tara LaCapra, Exclusive: Morgan Stanley Re-
builds in Commodities Trading, REUTERS (July 18, 2014), http://www.reuters 
.com/article/2014/07/18/us-morgan-stanley-commodities-idUSKBN0FN1RW20 
140718 (“After more than a year of scaling back in commodities, Morgan Stan-
ley is ready to expand.”). 
 37. See infra note 70; see also infra Part I.C (detailing Goldman Sachs’s 
alleged manipulation of the aluminum market in the United States). 
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tions stand ready to take their place—through the mixing of 
commerce and banking.38 While the combination of the banking 
and commerce spheres opens the door for commodity market 
manipulation, Section B describes the role of commodities ex-
changes as facilitators of such manipulation. 
B. THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF EXCHANGES:  
DEMUTUALIZATION 
Exchanges developed based on general demand for a com-
mon trading environment. 39  They “centralize the execution, 
clearing, and settlement of market transactions,” thus “increas-
ing liquidity, reducing the costs of capital, and encouraging in-
vestment and innovation.”40 As specialized firms, they are able 
to produce a more efficient trading environment and achieve 
lower transaction costs than any single market participant 
could on its own.41 Thus, participating members share a “ho-
mogenous interest in the success” of the exchange, notwith-
standing their “heterogeneous commercial interests.” 42  Ex-
changes also “aggregate and disseminate trading data” and 
“serve a governing role, introducing a regulatory framework in 
which market participants govern themselves.”43 
Exchanges were traditionally structured as non-profit or-
ganizations (although they paid taxes, unlike charities and ed-
ucational institutions) owned by market participants, or mem-
bers. 44  The members created “an internal governance 
arrangement, adopting bylaws, implementing a hierarchical 
decision-making process, electing directors, and appointing of-
ficers to govern” the exchange.45 Any profits realized by the ex-
change would be “returned to members in the form of lower ac-
cess fees or other benefits,” 46  thus aligning, at least 
theoretically, the interests of the exchange and its members.  
Futures exchanges, specifically, provide an environment 
 
 38. See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text. 
 39. See Kristin N. Johnson, Governing Financial Markets: Regulating 
Conflicts, 88 WASH. L. REV. 185, 197–201 (2013). 
 40. Id. at 200–01 (footnotes omitted). 
 41. See id. at 198–201. 
 42. Id. at 199. 
 43. Id. at 201. 
 44. See Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats into Shares: Causes and Impli-
cations of Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 
367, 403 (2002).  
 45. Johnson, supra note 39, at 199.  
 46. Karmel, supra note 44. 
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for trading futures contracts and options on futures contracts.47 
Congress gave exclusive jurisdiction over futures contracts and 
commodity options trading in the United States to the CFTC, 
an independent agency.48 The CFTC has deferred to commodi-
ties exchanges’ rulemaking and self-regulation, as the exchang-
es have a long history of self-regulation.49 In addition, the Na-
tional Futures Association (NFA), a freestanding self-regulator, 
“works with the CFTC to set standards for ethics training of 
industry professionals, the review of disclosure documents and 
issues concerning statutory disqualification of registered per-
sons and entities.”50 In short, commodities exchanges are self-
regulatory organizations (SROs) with CFTC oversight. 
Advancements in communication technologies and global 
competition have resulted in increasing cost pressures on ex-
changes.51 One response to these challenges has been demutu-
alization.52 Member firms have voted to convert exchanges from 
“non-profit cooperatives to private business[es],” with the new-
ly-private exchanges selling their equity shares to the public.53 
Because exchanges are now “international public corporations 
with freely transferable equity shares,” the potentially “diverse 
and widely dispersed shareholders . . . no longer share a ho-
 
 47. Futures Exchange, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ 
f/futuresexchange.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2015). A “futures contract” is “[a] 
legally binding agreement to buy or sell a commodity or financial instrument 
in a designated future month at a price agreed upon at the initiation of the 
contract by the buyer and seller.” Futures Contract, NASDAQ, http://www 
.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/f/futures-contract (last visited Oct. 12, 2015) 
(emphasis added). “Options are contracts through which a seller gives a buyer 
the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell a specified number of shares at 
a predetermined price within a set time period.” Options Defined, NASDAQ, 
http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/options-guide/definition-of-options.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2015). “Other underlying investments on which options can be 
based include stock indexes, Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), government se-
curities, foreign currencies or commodities like agricultural or industrial 
products.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 48. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 7 U.S.C. § 2 
(2012). By comparison, the SEC has jurisdiction over the sale and trading of 
securities, thus overseeing stock exchanges and not futures exchanges. See 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ 
cftc.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2015) (“The SEC administers and enforces the 
federal laws that govern the sale and trading of securities, such as stocks, 
bonds, and mutual funds, but we do not regulate futures trading.”); see also 
Karmel, supra note 44, at 400, 402 (“To a large extent the CFTC is an ana-
logue to the SEC with respect to the regulation of futures exchanges.”). 
 49. Karmel, supra note 44, at 402. 
 50. Id. at 402–03. 
 51. See id. at 368. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Johnson, supra note 39, at 204. 
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mogenous interest in promoting the SRO’s governance goals.”54 
Moreover, large shareholders of the exchange can potentially 
dictate such governance goals.55 Section C discusses a specific 
instance where the intersection of FHC commodity-related ac-
tivities and commodity exchange demutualization resulted in 
manipulation of the United States aluminum market, in part 
because the exchange failed to serve as an effective governing 
authority.  
C. CASE STUDY: GOLDMAN SACHS, METRO WAREHOUSES, AND  
THE LONDON METAL EXCHANGE 
Strong evidence shows that Goldman Sachs was able to 
gain monopolistic power in the United States aluminum mar-
ket following the 2008 financial crisis. In February 2010, 
Goldman Sachs purchased Metro International Trade Services 
LLC (Metro), a global metals warehousing company that owns 
and operates nineteen warehouses in Detroit,56 pursuant to its 
merchant banking authority.57 Goldman Sachs, meanwhile, also 
had a significant ownership stake in the London Metal Ex-
change (LME)58 until late 2012.59 Because the LME approved 
Metro’s warehouses as storage facilities for metals traded on 
the exchange, Goldman Sachs’ acquisition of Metro “strategical-
ly positioned the firm in the middle of the global metals trading 
chain” and “led other market participants to worry about unfair 
advantages for such firms.”60  
It appears that the other market participants’ worries were 
justified. Exit delays for removal of aluminum stored in Metro’s 
 
 54. Id. at 204–06. 
 55. See infra text accompanying notes 117–18. 
 56. Omarova, supra note 22, at 321. Goldman Sachs, however, “has begun 
a formal process” to sell the metals warehousing company. Mason, supra note 
36. 
 57. STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE S. 
COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 113TH CONG., REP. ON 
WALL STREET BANK INVOLVEMENT WITH PHYSICAL COMMODITIES 185 (Comm. 
Print 2014) [hereinafter REP. ON BANK INVOLVEMENT WITH PHYSICAL COM-
MODITIES]; see also supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the GLBA provisions permit-
ting FHCs to engage in commercial activities). 
 58. The LME is the “world [center] for the trading of industrial metals.” 
About Us, supra note 15. 
 59. REP. ON BANK INVOLVEMENT WITH PHYSICAL COMMODITIES, supra 
note 57, at 182–83.  
 60. Omarova, supra note 22, at 321–22 (“Ownership of the key LME 
warehouses by large commodity traders with integrated financial and physical 
metals operations allows them to control the supply of aluminum to commer-
cial users and, as a result, to control prices.”). 
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Detroit warehouses skyrocketed between 2010 and 2014.61 The 
Midwest Premium, a measure for the cost of delivering physical 
aluminum in the United States, also increased dramatically 
during the same period, both in real dollars—over 300%—and 
as a proportion of the “all-in” aluminum price.62 The Midwest 
Premium and exit queue length at Metro’s Detroit warehouses 
were highly correlated during that span, as the premium is “in-
tended to reflect, in part, storage costs.”63  
Goldman Sachs, arguably, was able to effect these changes 
in the United States aluminum market through its ownership 
of Metro and the LME. It orchestrated several “merry-go-
round” transactions in which the metal owner involved in the 
deal would cancel its warrants on hundreds of thousands of 
metric tons of aluminum, wait in line, load out its metal from 
the Metro warehouses, load it back into different Metro ware-
houses, and re-warrant the metal.64 These metal owners re-
ceived “surreptitious financial incentives for leaving their metal 
within the Metro warehouse system,” while other warehousing 
clients were superfluously blocked from exiting and charged 
with increased rent costs.65 Astoundingly, Metro’s warehouses 
were able to satisfy the LME’s minimum load-out requirement, 
notwithstanding their significant exit delays and “loaded out” 
metal not actually leaving the Metro system.66 In the end, these 
 
 61. REP. ON BANK INVOLVEMENT WITH PHYSICAL COMMODITIES, supra 
note 57, at 178 (describing how the exit “queue went from about 40 days to 
over 600 days”). 
 62. Id. at 171–73, 178 (“Physical aluminum contracts typically establish 
the aluminum price using several pricing components which, when combined, 
produce an ‘all-in’ aluminum price. One key component is the LME Official 
Price for aluminum as of a specific date or as an average over a specified peri-
od. That price is established through trading on the LME exchange and is 
generally recognized for aluminum as the ‘global reference for physical con-
tracts.’ The second key pricing component is a regional ‘premium,’ which is in-
tended to reflect the availability of aluminum in a particular geographic area 
and the cost of delivering aluminum there. The relevant premium for alumi-
num sold in the United States is the Midwest Aluminum Premium (Midwest 
Premium).” (footnotes omitted)). 
 63. Id. at 179. 
 64. Id. at 194–206. “Warrants” are “documents that convey actual legal 
title to specific lots of metal stored in LME-approved warehouses.” Id. at 175. 
If an owner wants to remove its metal from the warehouse, it “cancels” the 
warrant and has the metal delivered to a location of its choice. Id. at 175–76. 
 65. Id. at 222. 
 66. Id. at 194–206, 222. Rather than applying the minimum load out rate 
to each individual warehouse, the LME rules allowed Metro to apply the load 
out rate on a “collective basis” for all of its Detroit warehouses, thus creating a 
“single exit queue” for the entire Metro system. Id. at 192. While LME rules 
prohibited the loaded out metal from being immediately returned to the same 
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complex transactions seemed to “have had little economic ra-
tionale, but increased revenues to Metro and its owner, Gold-
man [Sachs].”67  
Goldman Sachs, meanwhile, was also actively trading 
physical aluminum and aluminum-related financial instru-
ments. Notwithstanding information barrier policies designed 
to eliminate impermissible access to proprietary information, 
Goldman Sachs “increased its aluminum trading, hired new 
aluminum traders friendly with Metro management, accumu-
lated massive aluminum holdings, engaged in outsized alumi-
num transactions, and traded in aluminum-related” financial 
products after obtaining access to Metro’s non-public infor-
mation.68 Thus, Goldman Sachs had emerged as an “increasing-
ly influential participant in the aluminum markets” following 
its acquisition of Metro.69 It is all but apparent that FHCs and 
other institutions have the tools needed to manipulate physical 
commodities markets.70 
Upset by delivery delays and increased aluminum costs, 
Coca-Cola filed a complaint with the LME in 2011, alleging 
that Goldman Sachs was purposely limiting the release of alu-
minum from its Metro-operated warehouses.71 Although the 
LME did eventually change its rules—doubling the minimum 
delivery rate for large warehouses—in response to consumer 
complaints, it was viewed as too little, too late.72 The LME, as 
 
warehouse, the owner was free to have it delivered to any other desired loca-
tion, including another Metro warehouse in the vicinity. Id. at  
204–07. 
 67. Id. at 222. Goldman Sachs also engaged in “large proprietary alumi-
num cancellations,” which had the same blocking effect. Id. 
 68. Id. at 182–83, 224–25 (noting that Goldman Sachs “owned no physical 
aluminum at all” when it purchased Metro, but held a stock exceeding “1.5 
million metric tons worth more than $3.2 billion dollars” by the end of 2012). 
Goldman Sachs was able to trade physical aluminum as a “complementary” 
activity. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 69. See REP. ON BANK INVOLVEMENT WITH PHYSICAL COMMODITIES, supra 
note 57, at 182. 
 70. Goldman Sachs was not the only FHC engaging in this type of con-
duct. Morgan Stanley and JPMC were also able to gain monopoly power over 
various commodities markets. See generally id. at 227–396 (discussing Morgan 
Stanley and JPMC’s questionable behavior in several commodities markets). 
FHCs were not the only entities involved in these activities. For example, 
Glencore, a commodity trading and mining company, participated in merry-go-
round transactions. See id. at 202–04. 
 71. See Omarova, supra note 22, at 323. 
 72. See Pratima Desai et al., Goldman’s New Money Machine: Ware-
houses, REUTERS (July 29, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/29/us 
-lme-warehousing-idUSTRE76R3YZ20110729 (“Critics dismiss the move as 
too small to have any real effect, especially because of the delay until [the new 
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an SRO, creates its own trading rules. As a demutualized ex-
change, the LME’s owners decide whether and to what extent 
the exchange’s rules and procedures need to be changed. Given 
its ownership of both Metro and the LME, Goldman Sachs was 
called to reevaluate exchange warehousing rules stemming 
from its own alleged wrongdoings, thus clearly raising a conflict 
of interest.73  
The GLBA presents FHCs with the statutory authority to 
mix banking and commerce, thus increasing their ability to 
manipulate commodities markets. Other non-FHCs also pos-
sess such ability.74 The demutualization of self-regulating com-
modities exchanges exacerbates the potential for market ma-
nipulation, as exchange ownership is now open to the general 
public and owners are arguably incentivized to adopt profit-
maximizing, self-serving rules. The underlying issue of ex-
change self-regulation transcends the question of who is doing 
the manipulating: Is it viable to rely on commodities exchanges 
to protect the integrity and efficiency of the trading markets 
given their transformation to shareholder-owned, for-profit 
businesses?75 Part II analyzes the merits of the current self-




II.  COMMODITIES EXCHANGES ARE NOT PROPERLY 
INCENTIVIZED TO PROMOTE MARKET EFFICIENCY AND 
INTEGRITY   
It has long been accepted that exchanges are ideal candi-
dates for self-regulation because they have appropriate incen-
tives to deter manipulation of their markets and possess the 
expertise to do so.76 Section A discusses the assumptions under-
lying the self-regulatory framework and argues that exchanges 
are not properly incentivized to promote market efficiency and 
integrity, especially in light of demutualization. Section B ex-
 
rule] comes in.”). 
 73. Moreover, Metro had personnel on an LME advisory committee for 
warehousing rules. REP. ON BANK INVOLVEMENT WITH PHYSICAL COMMODI-
TIES, supra note 57, at 182–83. 
 74. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
 75. See generally Karmel, supra note 44, at 420–27 (recognizing that ex-
change demutualization potentially creates conflicts of interest and briefly dis-
cussing different self-regulatory models). 
 76. See infra Part II.A.1. 
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plores options to compel exchanges to better deter manipula-
tion but recognizes their inadequacies, thus ultimately conclud-
ing that there needs to be a fundamental shift in the current 
self-regulatory framework. 
A. THE CURRENT SELF-REGULATORY MODEL RESTS ON FLAWED  
ASSUMPTIONS 
Exchanges have traditionally been self-regulatory organi-
zations free to set trading rules as they see fit. Subsection 1 
outlines the economic theories supporting exchange self-
regulation against market manipulation. Subsection 2 chal-
lenges their underlying assumptions, positing that exchanges 
are not incentivized to adequately deter manipulation. Subsec-
tion 3 describes further problems with exchange self-regulation 
given the trend toward demutualization. 
1. Economic Arguments in Favor of Exchange Self-Regulation  
Against Market Manipulation 
Futures market manipulation is defined as “the exercise of 
monopoly power as a futures contract nears expiration, com-
monly termed a ‘squeeze’ or a ‘corner.’”77 Such manipulation 
“distorts prices in both delivery and nondelivery markets, in-
duces uneconomic flows of the commodity, and distorts produc-
tion, storage, and transport decisions.”78 It also “redistributes 
wealth . . . to the manipulator,” “increases trading costs for 
nonmanipulators,” “increases basis risk, thereby harming 
hedgers,” and “reduces the informativeness of futures prices.”79 
 
 77. Self-Regulation, supra note 12, at 141. Although this is a fairly narrow 
definition, Goldman Sachs allegedly engaged in this exact type of manipula-
tion by using monopoly power to limit the supply of physical aluminum, thus 
“squeezing” or “cornering” the market. For detailed explanations of the eco-
nomics behind market power manipulation, see generally Stephen C. Pirrong, 
Mixed Manipulation Strategies in Commodity Futures Markets, 15 J. FUTURES 
MKTS. 13 (1995); Stephen C. Pirrong, Manipulation of the Commodity Futures 
Market Delivery Process, 66 J. BUS. 335 (1993). 
 78. Self-Regulation, supra note 12, at 148.  
 79. Id. A “hedge” occurs when an individual makes “an investment to re-
duce the risk of adverse price movements in an asset. Normally, a hedge con-
sists of taking an offsetting position in a related security, such as a futures 
contract.” Hedge, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hedge 
.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2015). “Basis risk” is the “risk that offsetting invest-
ments in a hedging strategy will not experience price changes in entirely oppo-
site directions from each other. This imperfect correlation between the two in-
vestments creates the potential for excess gains or losses in a hedging 
strategy, thus adding risk to the position.” Basis Risk, INVESTOPEDIA, http:// 
www.investopedia.com/terms/b/basisrisk.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2015). 
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Market manipulation, therefore, is to be avoided.80  
The theories supporting exchange self-regulation share the 
same basic premise: exchanges have a profit-maximizing incen-
tive to deter manipulation and adopt efficient rules.81 Ineffi-
cient rules increase trading costs, which results in lower trad-
ing volume. 82  Because of the direct relationship between 
trading volume and exchange profits, exchanges will maximize 
their profits by adopting the most efficient rules.83 In other 
words, “[i]t is plainly in the interest of exchanges to define the 
terms of contracts and establish rules that reduce the amount 
of monopoly and manipulation,”84 as customers will cease to 
trade on the exchange if it inadequately deters manipulation 
and allows trading costs to rise beyond acceptable levels. Thus, 
these theories conclude that anti-manipulation laws are unnec-
essary, as exchanges internalize the costs and benefits of deter-
ring manipulation.85  
The next issue, then, is whether the private costs and ben-
efits of deterrence are equal to the social costs and benefits.86 
While some scholars simply assume this to be true,87 others 
substantiate the claim based on the limited reach of futures 
markets inefficiencies: traders “bear most of the costs and re-
ceive most of the gains from trading in these markets.”88 Thus, 
only the exchanges and their customers substantially suffer 
from market manipulation, not the public at large.89  
Moreover, self-regulation advocates contend that external 
effects of manipulation are inconsequential to those who rely on 
 
 80. For a more thorough discussion of the adverse consequences, see Self-
Regulation, supra note 12, at 144–48. 
 81. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopoly, Manipulation, and the 
Regulation of Futures Markets, 59 J. BUS. S103, S112 (1986) (explaining that 
commodities exchanges are incentivized to reduce monopoly and manipula-
tion), with Self-Regulation, supra note 12, at 148–68 (criticizing commenta-
tors, such as Easterbrook, who argue that commodities exchanges are effi-
cient). 
 82. See Self-Regulation, supra note 12, at 148–49. 
 83. See id. 
 84. Easterbrook, supra note 81. 
 85. See Self-Regulation, supra note 12, at 142. 
 86. See Easterbrook, supra note 81, at S113. 
 87. E.g., id. at S113; Linda N. Edwards & Franklin R. Edwards, A Legal 
and Economic Analysis of Manipulation in Futures Markets, 4. J. FUTURES 
MKTS. 333, 355 (1984) (“[I]t is difficult to discern a significant divergence be-
tween the private costs and benefits and the social costs and benefits that are 
associated with preventive self-regulation.”). 
 88. Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipu-
lation” in Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 549 n.200 (1991). 
 89. Contra supra text accompanying note 5. 
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the accuracy of information embedded in futures prices to make 
allocative decisions (but do not actually trade on the exchange) 
because price distortions are short-lived and understood.90 The-
se passive information-consumers, in other words, are largely 
unaffected because they can discern when market manipula-
tion is occurring and effectively adjust their expectations and 
behavior. Furthermore, those who rely on accurate futures 
prices also trade in futures markets; thus, inaccurate prices 
will cause them to trade less and spur the exchange to better 
deter manipulation.91 Similarly, those dependent on informa-
tive futures prices also trade in spot markets,92 so exchanges 
are incentivized to deter even short lived, tail-end price manip-
ulation.93 Exchanges then, at least theoretically, are in the best 
position to regulate against market manipulation because they 
internalize the vast majority of the costs and benefits. Nonethe-
less, Subsection 2 explains why this is likely not the case in re-
ality. 
2. Exchanges Are Not Incentivized To Adequately Deter  
Manipulation 
It is not sound to assume that exchanges internalize nearly 
all of the costs and benefits of manipulation deterrence. Ma-
nipulation may decrease the demand for an exchange’s ser-
vices, as it reduces the efficacy of hedging and increases trading 
costs.94 The exchange, however, does not “necessarily bear the 
entire burden of this fall in demand” because customers bear 
some of the costs of insufficient precautions against manipula-
tion.95 For example, manipulation increases the volatility of fu-
tures prices, thus inducing marginal speculators to enter the 
market but also harming inframarginal users of futures con-
tracts, such as highly risk-averse hedgers.96 The reduced de-
mand from hedgers is somewhat (if not fully) offset by in-
 
 90. See Easterbrook, supra note 81, at S108 n.4; Edwards & Edwards, su-
pra note 87, at 346–47. 
 91. See Easterbrook, supra note 81, at S113. 
 92. A “spot market” is “[a] commodities or securities market in which 
goods are sold for cash and delivered immediately. Contracts bought and sold 
on these markets are immediately effective.” Spot Market, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/spotmarket.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 
2015). 
 93. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 88. 
 94. See Self-Regulation, supra note 12, at 151. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. at 152. Suppose there are 100 users of an exchange’s services. 
Users 1 to 100 are “inframarginal” users while the 101st user would be the 
“marginal” user. 
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creased demand from other exchange users.  
Furthermore, “the trading of the manipulators themselves 
(which is often massive) tends to increase the demand” for ex-
change services.97 As such, “it is possible that manipulation can 
actually increase” exchange wealth, even though it reduces 
other traders’ wealth by a larger amount.98 Because exchanges 
may incur “only a small fraction of the total costs of manipula-
tion,” they face “imperfect incentives” to deter it.99 
Advocates of self-regulation suggest that competition from 
other exchanges could mitigate these imperfect incentives, as 
the inframarginal users negatively affected by manipulation 
will take their business elsewhere.100 It is not clear, however, 
that exchanges can effectively compete with each other with 
regard to a particular contract: “Although exchanges may com-
pete vigorously to adopt new contracts, there are no major ex-
amples of the successful entry of a new contract in direct com-
petition with an established one.”101 This phenomenon could be 
due to existing contracts embodying efficient rules, but it could 
also be attributable to barriers to entry.102 Commodities futures 
contracts are conducive to natural monopolies because “concen-
trating all trading in a single contract increases liquidity and 
thereby reduces trading costs.”103  
In order to overcome illiquidity, a successful new contract 
must simultaneously attract a sufficient contingent of existing 
traders from the incumbent in addition to the dissatisfied trad-
ers currently out of the market altogether.104 Because of the dif-
ficulty in coordinating a widespread defection, “it is quite costly 
for an entrant contract to survive, even if its terms and the pol-
icies of the exchange offering it dominate the incumbent con-
tract and exchange.”105 Nonetheless, if another exchange can in-
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 153–54. 
 99. Id. at 154. 
 100. See id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See id. at 155. 
 105. Id.; see also REP. ON BANK INVOLVEMENT WITH PHYSICAL COMMODI-
TIES, supra note 57, at 177 (stating that “the new [Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change] aluminum products have been thinly traded”); Luzi-Ann Javier, Alu-
minum Futures Debut on CME Amid Wrangling on LME Rules, BLOOMBERG 
(May 6, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-06/aluminum 
-futures-debut-on-cme-amid-wrangling-on-lme-rules.html (noting that the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange “know[s] that it takes times [sic] for new con-
tracts to grow and develop liquidity”). 
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troduce a new contract that successfully competes with an ex-
isting one, “any lack of incentives to deter manipulation would 
afflict incumbent and potential entrant alike.”106 Thus, competi-
tion itself does not guarantee that an exchange will adequately 
deter manipulation and adopt efficient rules.107 
It is also tenuous to dismiss the importance of information 
externalities.108 Although it is possible that less efficient prices 
reduce demand for exchange services (since those who rely on 
efficient prices also trade on futures and spot markets—for ex-
ample, hedgers), “it is by no means clear that the costs imposed 
on exchanges” from this demand reduction “are even approxi-
mately equal in magnitude to the total costs arising from less 
informative prices.”109 This is because the value of risk reduc-
tion to a hedger is not binary—dependent “on whether prices 
are complete noise or perfectly informative”—but instead falls 
on a continuum—the greater the price efficiency, the greater 
the value.110 In other words, hedgers may continue to utilize ex-
change services, notwithstanding less informative prices, be-
cause there is still value in doing so (albeit not as much). While 
exchanges may bear some of the costs of inadequate manipula-
tion deterrence, there is reason to believe that they do not “in-
ternalize anywhere near all such costs, either in total or at the 
margin.”111 Notwithstanding an incomplete internalization of 
costs, Subsection 3 details how the trend toward demutualiza-
tion may positively incentivize exchanges to inadequately deter 
manipulation. 
3. Demutualization Exacerbates Inadequate Manipulation  
Deterrence 
Aside from the shortcomings of exchange-specific economic 
theories supporting self-regulation, there are also flawed as-
 
 106. Self-Regulation, supra note 12, at 155. 
 107. Id. (“One therefore cannot expect competition to ensure efficiency any 
more than one would expect competition between steel producers to induce 
them to control the costs of the pollution from their stacks that others bear.”). 
 108. See supra text accompanying notes 91–93. 
 109. Self-Regulation, supra note 12, at 156. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 156–57 (emphasis omitted). For a thorough discussion of empiri-
cal evidence supporting the view that exchange self-regulation is ineffective in 
deterring manipulation, see id. at 165–95. Contra Paul G. Mahoney, The Ex-
change as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1471 (1997) (“There is a large popu-
lar literature that suggests that manipulation was ubiquitous in the American 
financial markets before the turn of the century, but little detailed evidence of 
such manipulation exists. In most instances manipulation is inferred from 
large price swings.” (footnote omitted)). 
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sumptions underlying the overarching self-regulatory frame-
work employed in financial markets. The framework assumes 
that “SROs adopt innovative, timely regulatory solutions” and 
“implement and enforce rules consistent with federal regula-
tions and the public’s interest in market integrity and stabil-
ity.”112 The framework also presumes that “the person or group 
that exercises decision-making authority for the SRO will prior-
itize these regulatory norms.”113  The final assumption that 
SROs “embrace their role as enforcers of public policy” is likely 
the most questionable, as SROs are “neither government agen-
cies nor proxies of regulators.”114 Thus, SRO regulation does not 
necessarily align market participants’ behavior with the public 
interest.115 
Demutualization presents significant resistance to the pre-
sumption that exchanges will adequately promote market in-
tegrity and efficiency, as ownership is now open to the general 
public.116 Shareholders with profit-maximizing incentives may 
govern the exchange, and the exchange’s board of directors may 
choose to “prioritize[] earnings or the commercial interests of 
certain classes of shareholders above regulatory norms.” 117 
Thus, demutualization increases the risk that exchanges will 
“fail to serve as effective governing authorities” in the context 
of market manipulation.118 Given the flawed assumptions un-
derlying the arguments in favor of the current self-regulatory 
framework, Section B explores options to improve, but not fun-
damentally change, commodity exchange self-regulation. 
B. POTENTIAL CHANGES THAT PRESERVE THE CURRENT SELF- 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
While the current self-regulatory framework for exchanges 
has its shortcomings, it also has merit. Exchanges do internal-
 
 112. Johnson, supra note 39, at 202. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 203; cf. Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional 
Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 
1007 (2005) (discussing the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s 
status as a non-profit corporation with an “inherently governmental mission”). 
 115. Johnson, supra note 39, at 203; see also supra Part I.C (explaining 
how the LME failed to serve its public policy role). 
 116. See supra text accompanying notes 52–55. 
 117. Johnson, supra note 39, at 206; see also supra Part I.C (discussing 
Goldman Sachs’s ownership of the LME). 
 118. See Johnson, supra note 39, at 206; see also Onnig H. Dombalagian, 
Self and Self-Regulation: Resolving the SRO Identity Crisis, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. 
FIN. & COM. L. 317, 317 (2007) (“Market-based self-regulatory organizations 
(SROs) are in the throes of an identity crisis.”). 
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ize some of the costs associated with market manipulation, 
thus providing some incentive to deter it. More generally, SROs 
often use their “unique expertise and sophistication” to “adopt 
and implement industry standards that enhance efficiency and 
organization” within their specific industry.119 SROs are also 
“unencumbered by the bureaucratic processes that stymie gov-
ernment regulators’ rule-making efforts” and decrease respon-
siveness to violations of community standards. 120  Self-
regulation, therefore, presents “a dynamic alternative to the 
presumed binary choice between a laissez-fare and a command-
and-control regulatory approach.”121  
The complexity and global nature of the financial industry 
bolster the argument for exchange self-regulation.122 Moreover, 
the CFTC has shown signs of unwillingness to engage in more 
direct regulation of commodities exchanges.123 Commodity ex-
change self-regulation, however, has strayed too far toward the 
laissez-fare end of the regulatory continuum. Even though 
many exchanges are now for-profit businesses, they still “pro-
vide a critical, public, infrastructure resource within financial 
markets.”124 Subsections 1–2 discuss two suggestions aimed at 
focusing commodities exchanges on their public duties, but rec-
ognize that they fall short of a necessary, fundamental shift in 
the existing framework. 
1. Increased Pressure by the CFTC Office of the Inspector  
General 
Notwithstanding its oversight responsibilities, the CFTC 
has generally deferred to commodity exchange self-
regulation.125 Given this freedom, demutualized commodities 
exchanges are primed to adopt rules that maximize the ex-
change’s profits to the detriment of market efficiency and integ-
rity. One way to hone concentration on the public interest is to 
 
 119. Johnson, supra note 39, at 189. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 235. 
 122. See Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Fi-
nancial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 416 (2011) (arguing 
that financial industry self-regulation is a necessary component of a “workable 
long-term solution”). But cf. William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Be-
coming a Fifth Branch, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6 (2013) (“[T]he mismatch be-
tween SROs’ governmental powers and private unaccountability is leading our 
financial regulatory system towards an unstable and unsustainable structure  
. . . .”). 
 123. See supra note 18. 
 124. Johnson, supra note 39, at 221. 
 125. See supra text accompanying note 49. 
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strengthen CFTC oversight and buck the traditional inclination 
toward deference and inaction.  
Increased CFTC oversight could be achieved through the 
pressure of a “regulatory contrarian”: an entity that essentially 
regulates the regulator.126 The key duty of a regulatory contrar-
ian is to “counteract agency inaction or ossification in the face 
of changing market risks.”127 The regulatory contrarian has 
three distinct features: (1) it is “at least partially affiliated with 
a particular regulatory body but simultaneously enjoy[s] mean-
ingful independence from that agency”; (2) “possess[es] persua-
sive influence over its affiliated agency”; and (3) “stud[ies] and 
identif[ies] deficiencies and potential improvements in the reg-
ulatory process, regulatory policy, and/or the regulated mar-
ket.”128 Because regulatory contrarians have unique access to 
information and persuasive authority over their affiliated 
agencies, they likely have a “comparative advantage in empha-
sizing regulatory shortcomings and inaction.”129 
One recognized form of a regulatory contrarian is the office 
of the inspector general within an agency.130 The CFTC Office of 
the Inspector General is an independent unit within the CFTC 
charged with the “mission . . . to detect waste, fraud, and abuse 
and to promote integrity, economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 
in the CFTC’s programs and operations.” 131  The CFTC 
Inspectors General, therefore, assesses whether the CFTC is 
effectively monitoring exchanges and can recommend that the 
CFTC more closely scrutinize commodities exchanges’ efforts to 
promote the public interest.132 Increased CFTC scrutiny may 
force exchanges to better enforce their rules133 and take a more 
 
 126. See Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 
N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1632–33 (2011). 
 127. Id. at 1646. 
 128. Id. at 1645–46. 
 129. Id. at 1647. 
 130. See id. at 1661. 
 131. CFTC Organization, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMIS-
SION, http://www.cftc.gov/About/CFTCOrganization/index.htm (last visited 
Oct. 12, 2015).  
 132. The Inspector General of the SEC investigated the agency’s failure to 
prevent Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, ultimately influencing the scope and 
nature of SEC operational reforms. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 126, at 
1663. The Inspector General of the CFTC, similarly, could investigate the 
agency’s failure to prevent the LME’s tolerance for abusive warehousing prac-
tices. See infra note 198. Interestingly, it has been members of Congress, ra-
ther than the Inspector General, that has put pressure on the CFTC to more 
closely monitor the LME. See Brush, supra note 18. 
 133. Cf. REP. ON BANK INVOLVEMENT WITH PHYSICAL COMMODITIES, supra 
note 57, at 208 (stating that the LME viewed the merry-go-round transactions 
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public-oriented approach toward their promulgation.134 
While the use of internal audits and investigations likely 
increases agency accountability, inspectors general “are less ef-
fective than they could be at counteracting regulatory delay 
and inaction because they focus excessively on ‘compliance 
monitoring,’ or strict conformity with specific rules and regula-
tions.”135 It is also important to “establish[] positive incentives 
for achieving desired outcomes (‘performance accountability’) 
and promot[e] agency technologies and expertise (‘capacity 
building accountability’),”136 but the typical inspector general is 
arguably ill-equipped to focus on these areas of accountabil-
ity.137 
Notwithstanding the deficiencies of inspectors general, the 
CFTC is seemingly reluctant to become more involved with ex-
change regulation.138 The CFTC currently acts as a backstop, 
whereby exchanges’ self-promulgated rules become effective un-
less the CFTC actively intervenes.139 While the CFTC clearly 
has the ability to reject rules, history has shown that it does 
not in fact do so.140 Moreover, the Dodd-Frank Act has imposed 
additional responsibilities upon the CFTC141 without providing 
 
as “inconsistent with the ‘spirit’ of the relevant [LME] requirements” but that 
such transactions “may not violate the ‘letter’ of those requirements”). 
 134. See 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(5) (2012) (providing the circumstances where 
the CFTC is to reject exchange-promulgated rules). 
 135. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 126, at 1663–64; accord PAUL C. 
LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH 
FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 224 (1993).  
 136. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 126, at 1664; accord LIGHT, supra 
note 135, at 220. 
 137. See William S. Fields, The Enigma of Bureaucratic Accountability, 43 
CATH. U. L. REV. 505, 518–19 (1994) (book review) (arguing that inspectors 
general are not well-suited to institute agency accountability methods other 
than compliance monitoring). 
 138. See supra note 18; see also SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, WHITE PAPER: REIN-
VENTING SELF-REGULATION 23 (Oct. 14, 2003), http://www.sifma.org/issues/ 
item.aspx?id=21354 (noting the CFTC’s hesitation to administer “a program 
that required direct CFTC regulation for certain futures commission mer-
chants” because it “would be difficult” and the agency “lacked sufficient re-
sources to devote to such direct regulation”). 
 139. See Derek Fischer, Note, Dodd-Frank’s Failure To Address CFTC 
Oversight of Self-Regulatory Organization Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 
69, 92 (2015) (contrasting the CFTC’s approach with that of the SEC, which 
reviews every proposed rule change except those that the SRO designates as 
exceptionally insubstantial). 
 140. See id. at 97 (finding that between 2008 and 2012, the CFTC did not 
reject a single proposed rule from the National Futures Association and adopt-
ed unchanged versions 93% of the time).  
 141. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. 7, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641–1802 (codified in vari-
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additional resources, thus stretching the agency even thin-
ner.142 Heightened CFTC oversight of exchanges would require 
a major shift from its current deferential approach, and the 
Inspector General is not in a strong position to hold the agency 
accountable for implementing such a shift. Given the challeng-
es of strengthening CFTC oversight, Subsection 2 offers an al-
ternative approach that focuses on preventing potential con-
flicts of interest caused by demutualization. 
2. Limitations on Exchange Ownership and Control 
As a result of demutualization, large financial institutions 
and securities dealers can potentially acquire significant own-
ership stakes (and voting control) in exchanges.143 This raises a 
conflict of interest because, as owners of the exchange, they will 
be responsible for regulating their actions as market partici-
pants.144 In governing an exchange, such financial institutions 
may be incentivized to prioritize their own interests over regu-
latory norms or the public interest.145 
One potential solution for such conflicts is to limit ex-
change ownership and control. With respect to clearinghous-
es,146 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to-
gether with the CFTC proposed two options aimed at 
preventing large dealers from dominating boards of directors 
and preserving board independence.147 The first proposal im-
poses individual and aggregate ownership limits for “specified 
entities” in an effort to promote diversity in board membership, 
 
ous sections of 7 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., and 15 U.S.C.). 
 142. See David Dayen, Congress Is Starving the Agency That’s Supposed To 
Prevent Another Meltdown, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.new  
republic.com/article/115511/cftc-funding-will-prevent-it-regulating-derivatives 
(“[The CFTC] has seen its operations squeezed by drastic underfunding, right 
at the time the Dodd-Frank financial reform law dropped a whole new set of 
responsibilities in its lap.”). 
 143. See, e.g., text accompanying supra note 59. 
 144. See, e.g., supra note 73 and accompanying text.  
 145. See supra text accompanying notes 117–18. 
 146. A “clearinghouse” is “[a]n agency or separate corporation of a futures 
exchange responsible for settling trading accounts, clearing trades, collecting 
and maintaining margin monies, regulating delivery and reporting trading 
data.” Clearing House, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/ 
clearinghouse.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2015). 
 147. See Johnson, supra note 39, at 229–30; Ownership Limitations and 
Governance Requirements for Security-Based Swap Clearing Agencies, Securi-
ty-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National Securities Exchanges with 
Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,882, 
65,894–904 (proposed Oct. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Regulation MC] (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. § 242.00–02). 
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increase the likelihood of objective board decisions, and hamper 
large dealers’ ability to gain voting control.148 Under this pro-
posal, a “specified entity” may not directly or indirectly own 
more than twenty percent (and a group of specified entities 
may not collectively own more than forty percent) of the clear-
inghouse’s voting power.149 The second option further restricts 
ownership, prohibiting any specified entity or individual mem-
ber from owning more than five percent of the clearinghouse’s 
voting control.150  
Both also impose board composition and committee re-
quirements. The first alternative requires the board to be com-
posed of at least thirty-five percent independent directors,151 
while the second requires a majority of independent directors.152 
Moreover, each proposal forces the board of the clearinghouse 
to create a nominating committee, disciplinary panel, and risk-
management committee.153 The CFTC could impose similar re-
strictions on commodity exchange ownership and control. 
However, this corporate governance approach to eliminat-
ing conflicts of interest is not without its weaknesses. Notwith-
standing these ownership and control limitations, large securi-
ties dealers may collaborate to defeat them.154 In addition, “the 
appointment of independent directors may not effectively ad-
dress concerns regarding policies that support large dealers’ 
commercial incentives,” as they may face conflicts of interest 
similar to those that inside directors face.155 Even if such inde-
pendent directors were effective in steering exchange policy 
away from certain owners’ commercial interests, “it may be dif-
ficult to identify individuals who are truly independent”; that 
is, “free from relational ties to large dealers.”156  Thus, re-
strictions on exchange ownership and control may be circum-
vented or ineffective in establishing independent, public-
oriented governance. 
 
 148. Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. at 65,894–99; Johnson, supra note 39, at 
230. 
 149. Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. at 65,894–99. 
 150. Id. at 65,899–904. 
 151. Id. at 65,896. 
 152. Id. at 65,901. 
 153. Id. at 65,897–98, 65,901–02. 
 154. See Johnson, supra note 39, at 231. 
 155. Id.; accord Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Be-
tween Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 
231, 233 (2002); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 
IOWA L. REV. 127, 174–76 (2010). 
 156. Johnson, supra note 39, at 232 (emphasis omitted). 
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The suggestions discussed in Subsections 1–2 are pragmat-
ic. The Inspector General within the CFTC already exists and 
can apply pressure on the CFTC to more closely scrutinize ex-
changes’ self-regulation. The SEC and CFTC’s two alternatives 
regarding limitations on clearinghouse ownership and control 
can serve as blueprints for establishing similar restrictions on 
commodities exchanges. In addition, these options are not mu-
tually exclusive. The CFTC can strengthen its oversight of ex-
changes’ self-promulgated rules while also imposing corporate 
governance controls. Neither, however, constitutes the type of 
wholesale reform needed to ensure that commodities exchanges 
focus their rulemaking efforts on adequately deterring manipu-
lation and promoting market efficiency and integrity. Part III 
proposes a major shift in the commodity exchange self-
regulatory framework: the creation of a new, independent regu-
latory entity structured similar to the FASB that is responsible 
for promulgating exchange rules and procedures. 
III.  A NEW SELF-REGULATORY MODEL: THE FASB FOR 
COMMODITIES EXCHANGES   
Although the SEC has statutory authority to establish fi-
nancial accounting standards for publicly traded companies, its 
“policy has been to rely on the private sector for this function to 
the extent that the private sector demonstrates ability to fulfill 
the responsibility in the public interest.”157 Enter the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board: the designated organization for 
developing financial accounting standards that govern the 
preparation of nongovernmental financial reports.158 Given the 
similarities between the stakeholders in financial accounting 
standards and those in commodity exchange rules, the 
strengths of the FASB-structure could be leveraged to improve 
commodity exchange self-regulation.159 
Section A discusses the FASB’s ability to achieve institu-
tional stability and legitimacy, notwithstanding its status as a 
private entity facing constant opposition from its own constitu-
ents. Section B analogizes the stakeholders in financial ac-
counting standards to those in commodity exchange rules and 
procedures, concluding that their similarities warrant the crea-
tion of a FASB-structured regulatory entity. Finally, Section C 
 
 157. Facts About FASB, FASB, http://www.fasb.org/facts (last visited Oct. 
12, 2015). 
 158. Id. As such, the SEC officially recognizes the FASB’s standards as au-
thoritative. Id. 
 159. See infra Parts III.A–B.  
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outlines a basic plan for organizing the new entity as well as 
acknowledges some of the challenges it will face.  
A. THE FASB’S INDEPENDENCE AND GOAL OF “DECISION  
USEFULNESS” 
The FASB is a self-regulatory organization for the account-
ing industry. It sets financial accounting standards for firms 
and management (Preparers), and auditors verify that Prepar-
ers properly follow these standards in producing financial re-
ports for investors, creditors, and other financial market partic-
ipants (Users). Subsection 1 provides the argument against 
self-regulation, or private standard-setting, while Subsection 2 
explains how the FASB is able to overcome it, at least theoreti-
cally. Subsection 3 contends that the FASB’s practices justify 
private standard-setting.  
1. Argument Against Private Financial Accounting Standard- 
Setting  
The line of reasoning critiquing private standard-setting 
focuses on the protection of the public interest. It is clear that 
accounting principles significantly influence allocative deci-
sions,160 and there is no such thing as a neutral and transparent 
accounting principle.161 Thus, setting accounting standards is “a 
high-stakes game in which the setter ha[s] no alternative but to 
balance interests.”162 Because the standard-setter is largely re-
solving political rather than technical issues, its legitimacy is 
dependent on political responsiveness.163 The use of a private, 
independent standard-setter, therefore, is likely to result in “ir-
relevance, isolation, and unaccountability.”164 Notwithstanding 
any potential loss in economic efficiency,165 the power to set ac-
 
 160. William W. Bratton, Private Standards, Public Governance: A New 
Look at the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 48 B.C. L. REV. 5, 19 
(2007). 
 161. George Mundstock, The Trouble with FASB, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 813, 822 (2003). 
 162. Bratton, supra note 160; accord ROBERT VAN RIPER, SETTING STAND-
ARDS FOR FINANCIAL REPORTING: FASB AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF 
A CRITICAL PROCESS 73–74 (1994). 
 163. Bratton, supra note 160. 
 164. Mundstock, supra note 161, at 820. 
 165. A public standard-setter would not be without its costs. Regulatory 
failures are generally understood to include “rigidity, monetary waste, a ten-
dency to uniformity, and the suppression of innovation.” Orly Lobel, The Re-
new Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary 
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 444 (2004). On the other hand, see su-
pra text accompanying notes 119–20 for a general discussion of the benefits of 
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counting standards must be vested in an agency directly re-
sponsible to Congress in order to ensure accountability.166 
Accountability and independence, however, are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive. Subsection 2 explains how the 
FASB’s stated preference for “decision usefulness” epitomizes 
the idea of the new governance model: “economic efficiency and 
democratic legitimacy can, under certain conditions, point in 
the same direction.”167 
2. The FASB’s Explicit Choice To Favor Users of Financial  
Reports 
The FASB’s decision usefulness underpinning is contained 
in the Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1: “Fi-
nancial reporting should provide information that is useful to 
present and potential investors and creditors and other users in 
making rational investment, credit, and similar decisions.”168 
By raising external transparency, or decision usefulness, over 
internal managerial control of financial reporting treatments, 
the FASB created an “overriding goal” in developing stand-
ards.169 Without an overriding goal, the FASB would end up 
with “the political task of accommodating conflicting interests 
as it pursue[d] multiple goals,”170 thus compromising its inde-
pendence. The FASB’s explicit focus on Users, therefore, pro-
vides it with substantive legitimacy as an independent, expert 
organization.  
Decision usefulness is also “generally accepted as a policy 
matter” and “aligns the FASB with information economics.”171 
Because financial information is a public good that would be 
underprovided without regulation, accounting standards with a 
decision usefulness underpinning reduce information asymme-
tries and the associated social costs—high transaction costs 
 
self-regulation. 
 166. See Bratton, supra note 160; ROBERT CHATOV, CORPORATE FINANCIAL 
REPORTING: PUBLIC OR PRIVATE CONTROL? 7–8 (1975). 
 167. Lobel, supra note 165, at 443. 
 168. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AC-
COUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 1: OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL REPORTING BY BUSI-
NESS ENTERPRISES 5 (1978), http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/ 
DocumentPage?cid=1218220132512&acceptedDisclaimer=true. 
 169. See Bratton, supra note 160, at 29 (remarking on the “expertise mod-
el”); see also JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 50–51 (1938) 
(discussing the need for a stated objective similar to an overriding goal).  
 170. Bratton, supra note 160, at 29; see Richard B. Stewart, The Refor-
mation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1702 (1975). 
 171. Bratton, supra note 160, at 26–27. 
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and thin, illiquid capital markets.172 If investors had access to 
different levels of information, then those with access to higher 
levels would likely experience outsized returns while those with 
access to lower levels would drop out of the market.173 As a re-
sult, “spreads would widen, transaction costs would rise, and 
volume would drop.”174 User-focused standards place investors 
on a relatively equal footing (at least in terms of publicly avail-
able information), thus enhancing allocative efficiency.175 
User-oriented standards also balance the reporting system, 
as dispersed Users of financial statements “have no incentive to 
produce standards.”176 If financial statement Preparers and au-
ditors worked together to create financial accounting stand-
ards, then “management would have an advantage in getting 
rule innovations to suit its interests, causing information 
asymmetries.”177 Thus, the FASB is justified in favoring deci-
sion usefulness instead of applying an interest-balancing ap-
proach. Subsection 3 discusses how the FASB has stayed true 
to its public-oriented mission in practice.  
3. The FASB’s Practices Legitimate Private Standard-Setting  
Notwithstanding Preparer opposition, the FASB has con-
sistently pursued decision usefulness. Preparers have used 
both the FASB notice and comment process178 and the Financial 
Accounting Standards Advisory Council (FASAC)179 advisory 
process to lobby for their interests, but to no avail.180 Although 
 
 172. Id. at 30–31; Baruch Lev, Toward a Theory of Equitable and Efficient 
Accounting Policy, 63 ACCT. REV. 1, 9 (1988). 
 173. Bratton, supra note 160, at 31; Lev, supra note 172, at 6–7. 
 174. Bratton, supra note 160, at 31; accord Lev, supra note 172, at 8. 
 175. See Bratton, supra note 160, at 31; Lev, supra note 172, at 4–9. 
 176. Bratton, supra note 160, at 31; accord Ronald King & Gregory 
Waymire, Accounting Standard-Setting Institutions and the Governance of In-
complete Contracts, 9 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 579, 594–96 (1994). 
 177. Bratton, supra note 160, at 31; see King & Waymire, supra note 176, 
at 594–95. 
 178. The FASB’s standards-setting process is structured to “encourage[] 
broad participation” and “objectively consider[] all stakeholder views.” Stand-
ard-Setting Process, FASB, http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage& 
cid=1351027215692 (last visited Oct. 12, 2015) (providing an overview of the 
FASB’s seven-step standard-setting process). See generally FIN. ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BD., RULES OF PROCEDURE (2014), http://www.fasb.org/cs/Content 
Server?c=Document_C&pagename=FASB%2FDocument_C%2FDocument 
Page&cid=1176162391050 (detailing the FASB’s organizational mission, 
structure, and operating procedures). 
 179. See infra note 210. 
 180. See Bratton, supra note 160, at 34; see also VAN RIPER, supra note 162, 
at 99; Dennis R. Beresford, Commentary, How Should the FASB Be Judged?, 
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Preparers “complain and get occasional concessions,” the FASB 
“continues to promulgate standards that they oppose.”181 Be-
cause the FASB’s dedication to providing standards with deci-
sion usefulness aligns with the SEC’s mission to protect Users, 
the two institutions have a symbiotic relationship.182 The FASB 
largely operates free from political pressure and overbearing 
oversight, and the SEC saves resources by relying on a private 
entity to create financial accounting standards.183 Its power, 
however, is not unchecked: “The FASB’s authority depends on 
SEC certification, and because the SEC maintains its own 
standard-setting capacity, it can overrule the FASB by taking a 
matter into its own hands.”184 The FASB’s decision usefulness 
underpinning ensures that it maintains a public tilt and re-
mains in the SEC’s good graces, thus liberating it from constit-
uent pressures and allowing it to positively sustain independ-
ence. Given the FASB’s ability to consistently act in the public 
interest, Section B argues for the creation of a FASB-structured 
regulatory entity for commodities exchanges.  
B. COMMODITY EXCHANGE SELF-REGULATION IS CONDUCIVE TO  
THE FASB MODEL 
The current commodity exchange self-regulatory frame-
work fails to effectively promote the public interest in market 
efficiency and integrity. The FASB, however, “provides an ex-
cellent example of a successful public-to-private contract” for 
creating financial accounting standards that protect Users.185 
Given the similarities between the stakeholders in financial ac-
counting standards and those in commodity exchange rules, the 
creation of a FASB-structured regulatory entity for commodi-
 
ACCT. HORIZONS, June 1995, at 56, 60–61. 
 181. Bratton, supra note 160, at 34; see VAN RIPER, supra note 162, at 98, 
118–31, 183. But see Mundstock, supra note 161, at 839 (“When faced with 
controversy, particularly critiques from business interests, the private stand-
ard-setter has either reorganized or capitulated.”). 
 182. Bratton, supra note 160, at 35–36 (“The alignment, thus set in theory, 
works in practice because the FASB’s appointments structure and rules of in-
dependence assure that its members pursue its formal mission rather than 
constituent or personal interests.”).  
 183. Id. The two institutions regularly communicate and collaborate. See 
id. at 36; see also Lobel, supra note 165, at 376–79 (discussing collaborative 
governance). 
 184. Bratton, supra note 160, at 36; see Matthew J. Barrett, The SEC and 
Accounting, in Part Through the Eyes of Pacioli, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 
868 (2005); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Cop-
yright, Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291, 323 
(2005).  
 185. Bratton, supra note 160, at 35. 
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ties exchanges is a logical and viable solution.186 Subsection 1 
analogizes the stakeholders in financial accounting standards 
to those in commodity exchange rules, contending that the new 
regulatory entity explicitly favor the interests of end-
users/producers (Hedgers) over large financial institu-
tions/other speculative traders (Speculators). Subsection 2 
briefly explains the new organization’s position with respect to 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a self-
regulator for the securities industry, and the National Futures 
Association (NFA), a self-regulator for the futures industry. 
1. The Stakeholders of Financial Accounting Standards and  
Commodity Exchange Regulation 
Preparers produce financial statements using financial ac-
counting standards while Users rely on those statements to 
make decisions.187 Preparers and Users generally have conflict-
ing interests.188 Auditors, meanwhile, assure that Preparers are 
properly adhering to financial accounting standards. Because 
Preparers are the auditors’ clients, auditors and Preparers’ in-
terests are reasonably aligned.  
In commodities futures markets, Hedgers use hedging 
strategies to reduce the risk of commodity price movements 
while Speculators aim to profit from such price movements.189 
 
 186. It is worth noting one potential objection to the comparison. Account-
ing is widely viewed as a “profession,” while work in the financial industry is 
generally not associated with the same formal designation. Thus, it is argua-
bly illogical to compare rulemaking for the two industries. However, “profes-
sions” are generally characterized by the use of a “specialized language” that 
separates those within the profession from those outside of it. See Mundstock, 
supra note 161, at 822; see also Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Professional Autono-
my and the Social Control of Expertise, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFES-
SIONS 38, 53 (Robert Dingwall & Philip Lewis eds., 1983) (“Exaggerated claims 
of validity and effectiveness, selective development of knowledge, protective 
maintenance of mystique and complexity, over-education with the aim of pro-
fessional respectability and limitation of access to the profession are more or 
less common.”). The financial industry is undoubtedly complex and requires a 
specific knowledge base. Because trading commodities futures (and work in 
the financial industry in general) requires the use of a “specialized language,” 
the lack of a formal designation as a “profession” is irrelevant for this compar-
ison. 
 187. See Bratton, supra note 160, at 7–9. 
 188. See id. at 9. Preparers would prefer less disclosure, while Users would 
prefer greater disclosure. 
 189. Reem Heakal, Futures Fundamentals: The Players, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/university/futures/futures3.asp (last visited Oct. 
12, 2015); see also supra Parts II.A.1–2 (discussing the economics of commodi-
ties markets). Financial institutions speculate in commodities by holding pro-
prietary positions in commodity-linked securities and/or physical commodities 
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Thus, Hedgers and Speculators have opposite goals. 190  Ex-
changes, meanwhile, supply orderliness to the trading process 
and assure that trades are properly executed (i.e., according to 
exchange rules). Because Speculators seek price volatility, they 
are incentivized to gain market power and induce artificial 
price movements through manipulative behavior.191 Commodi-
ties exchanges stand to benefit from manipulation (especially in 
light of demutualization),192 so their interests are reasonably 
aligned with Speculators seeking to gain monopoly power. 
While (some) Speculators profit from price distortions, Hedgers 
benefit from efficient prices, which induce economic flows of 
commodities and informed production, storage, and transporta-
tion decisions.193  
Similar to the FASB’s preference for Users, the new regu-
latory entity for commodities exchanges would explicitly favor 
the interests of Hedgers over Speculators. The same rationales 
apply: giving preference to Hedgers avoids the political task of 
balancing conflicting interests and aligns with the economics 
underlying commodity exchange regulation.194 Thus, in theory, 
the new entity would be both independent and legitimate from 
a policy standpoint. Its mission would be to promulgate ex-
change rules that support transactions with economic grounds 
and promote market efficiency and integrity.195  
The LME’s warehousing load-out rules provide an instance 
where market efficiency and integrity likely were not priori-
tized.196 In particular, one warehousing rule explicitly favored 
the interest of metal owners to freely transfer their metal over 
general market efficiency, ultimately benefiting Speculators to 
the detriment of Hedgers.197 Conversely, the new regulatory en-
 
without having a productive use for the raw materials. See supra Part I.C. 
 190. See Heakal, supra note 189 (“Hedgers want to minimize their risk no 
matter what they’re investing in, while [S]peculators want to increase their 
risk and therefore maximize their profits.”). 
 191. See supra Part I.C. It is possible, however, for Hedgers to inadvertent-
ly obtain market power and squeeze the market. Self-Regulation, supra note 
12, at 147. 
 192. See supra Parts II.A.2–3. 
 193. See supra text accompanying notes 78–80. 
 194. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 195. Cf. supra text accompanying note 67 (showing a clear and present 
need for such a body). 
 196. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (describing an LME rule 
that allows a metal owner to remove its metal from the warehouse only to im-
mediately place it in a different warehouse owned by the same warehousing 
company in the same area); see also REP. ON BANK INVOLVEMENT WITH PHYSI-
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tity’s Hedger underpinning would better ensure the creation of 
rules that resist abusive warehousing practices.198 By favoring 
Hedgers over Speculators, the new entity would be better able 
to deter manipulation and ensure market efficiency and integ-
rity. Notwithstanding a common focus on the public interest, 
Subsection 2 discusses the new regulatory entity’s narrow 
scope of responsibility as compared to FINRA and the NFA. 
2. The New Entity’s Position Relative to FINRA and the NFA 
Similar to the new regulatory organization, FINRA and the 
NFA are public-oriented self-regulators.199 FINRA is the “single 
self-regulator for all securities firms doing business with the 
public.”200 It is responsible for surveillance, investigation, rule 
promulgation, and enforcement with respect to securities deal-
ers and brokers.201 Thus, FINRA mainly focuses on market in-
tegrity from the securities-firm level.202 The NFA, in large part, 
is FINRA’s counterpart for the futures industry, but with argu-
ably fewer responsibilities.203  
The new entity, on the other hand, would be operating one 
level removed from traders—concerned with the commodities 
 
CAL COMMODITIES, supra note 57, at 207 (noting that Metro claimed to be 
merely respecting that “the LME has long recognized the right of the metal 
owner to decide what to do with free metal” by allowing loaded-out metal to be 
immediately stored in a different Metro warehouse). It would be counterpro-
ductive for a Hedger to engage in this type of activity, as the decision to load 
out metal would be based on production needs. 
 198. See REP. ON BANK INVOLVEMENT WITH PHYSICAL COMMODITIES, supra 
note 57, at 192 (“Goldman and Metro’s use of the LME load-out rate as a max-
imum rather than minimum load-out rate has been targeted as an abusive 
practice in over a dozen class action suits.”). For example, a Hedger-friendly 
rule would require warehouses to load out greater quantities if cancelled war-
rants reached a certain level. See supra Part I.C. 
 199. About FINRA, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/about (last visited Oct. 12, 
2015); Who We Are, NFA, https://www.nfa.futures.org/NFA-about-nfa/index 
.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2015). 
 200. Jonathan Macey & Caroline Novogrod, Enforcing Self-Regulatory Or-
ganization’s Penalties and the Nature of Self-Regulation, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
963, 964 (2012). 
 201. See id.; What We Do, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/about/what-we-do 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2015). 
 202. FINRA does perform market regulation functions for some securities 
exchanges. Macey & Novogrod, supra note 200. But see John McCrank,  
NYSE To Take Back Policing Duties from Wall Street Watchdog, REUTERS 
(Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/06/ice-nyse-regulations 
-idUSL2N0S12N020141006. Commodities exchanges have largely retained 
their market regulation responsibilities. See, e.g., LONDON METAL EXCH., su-
pra note 17; Rulebooks, CME GROUP, http://www.cmegroup.com/market 
-regulation/rulebook (last visited Oct. 12, 2015). 
 203. See supra text accompanying note 50. 
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exchanges themselves. Moreover, the organization’s exclusive 
responsibility would be exchange rule promulgation. In other 
words, the new entity would fill a niche role that is currently 
occupied by for-profit, demutualized exchanges.204 In light of 
this narrow scope of responsibility, Section C outlines a few 
basic ideas for implementing such an entity and acknowledges 
challenges with doing so. 
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FASB FOR COMMODITIES  
EXCHANGES 
Given the trend toward exchange demutualization, the Se-
curities Industry Association (later renamed Securities Indus-
try and Financial Markets Association) established guiding 
principles for evaluating different regulatory options: any regu-
latory structure should “foster investor protection; preserve fair 
competition; eliminate inefficiencies; encourage expert regula-
tion; promote reasonable and fair regulatory costs; foster due 
process; and encourage industry participation and self-
regulation.”205 A FASB-structured regulatory entity for com-
modities exchanges largely comports with these principles. It 
would be a group of independent, knowledgeable experts 
charged with the mission of promulgating rules that favor 
Hedgers, thus deterring manipulation and promoting market 
efficiency and integrity. Subsection 1 provides a basic structure 
for the new entity, and Subsection 2 proposes its regulatory fo-
cus. Subsection 3 briefly discusses challenges facing the new 
rule promulgator. 
1. Organizational Structure of the New Entity 
If the new entity is similarly situated to the FASB vis-à-vis 
its mission and stakeholders, then it is logical to also organize 
it in a similar manner in an effort to replicate the FASB’s suc-
cess.206 Following the blueprint of the FASB, the board of the 
new organization would be composed of three exchange repre-
sentatives, two Speculator representatives, one Hedger repre-
sentative, and an academic.207 It would vote on a simple majori-
 
 204. The new entity would likely work closely with NFA, thus further 
likening NFA to FINRA with regard to the scope of its responsibilities. See in-
fra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 205. Karmel, supra note 44, at 424; accord SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, supra note 
138, at 3–4. 
 206. See supra Parts III.A–B. 
 207. The FASB is comprised of three Certified Public Accountants, two 
Preparer representatives, one User representative, and one academic. See 
Bratton, supra note 160, at 23; see also VAN RIPER, supra note 162, at 125–26. 
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ty basis.208 The new regulatory entity would also be publicly 
funded: the federal government would levy fees on institutional 
traders (formerly known as an exchange’s members), and after 
the CFTC recognized the new entity as the authoritative prom-
ulgator of commodity exchange rules, it would be funded 
through those fees.209 
A surrounding regulatory framework is necessary for the 
implementation of the new entity. It would benefit from an ad-
visory council, similar to the FASAC, containing members rep-
resentative of the constituent groups and possessing relevant 
skills and knowledge.210 A high-ranking member of the CFTC 
would be part of the council.211 Another supporting piece is al-
ready in place. The NFA, playing the role of the Financial Ac-
counting Foundation (FAF), would be responsible for the over-
sight, administration, and finances of the new regulatory 
organization.212 With a structure and surrounding framework 
similar to that of the FASB, the new entity would likely to be in 
 
 208. The FASB also operates on a simple four-to-three majority rule. See 
Bratton, supra note 160, at 23–24. Although “studies have looked for connec-
tions between the members’ votes and prior affiliations,” they have “found 
nothing significant.” Id. at 24; see John C. McEnroe & Stanley C. Martens, An 
Analysis of the FASB’s Independence, J. APPLIED BUS. RES., Winter 1996/1997, 
at 129, 131–32 (determining that the FASB’s members vote independently). 
Likewise, there have not been any significant voting coalitions between former 
auditors and Preparers. Bratton, supra note 160, at 24; see, e.g., D. Paul 
Newman, An Investigation of the Distribution of Power in the APB and the 
FASB, 19 J. ACCT. RES. 247, 261 (1981) (finding that auditor representative 
influence has not been dominant). The hope would be that the members of the 
new regulatory entity would vote in a similarly independent manner. 
 209. The FASB stopped collecting contributions and became publicly fund-
ed in 2002, receiving federal government funding collected from fees levied on 
reporting companies. Bratton, supra note 160, at 24; see Cunningham, supra 
note 184. But cf. infra Part III.C.3 (noting the challenge of the new entity 
gaining such approval). 
 210. The FASAC is a group of FASB constituents that “consults with the 
FASB on technical issues, project priorities, and other matters likely to con-
cern the FASB.” Facts About FAF, FAF, http://www.accountingfoundation 
.org/cs/ContentServer?c=Page&pagename=Foundation%2FPage%2FFAF 
SectionPage&cid=1176157790151 (last visited Oct. 12, 2015). The FASB’s 
founders created the FASAC in an effort to ensure that the FASB was respon-
sive to constituent interests. See CHATOV, supra note 166, at 232–39; VAN RIP-
ER, supra note 180, at 9, 17; Bratton, supra note 160, at 14–15. The FASAC 
helps the FASB “prioritize, set agenda items, and keep things moving.” Brat-
ton, supra note 160, at 15; accord CHATOV, supra note 166, at 234. 
 211. The original FASAC contained the SEC’s Chief Accountant. CHATOV, 
supra note 166, at 15; Bratton, supra note 160, at 15. 
 212. The FAF is an independent, not-for-profit entity that is responsible for 
the oversight, administration, and finances of the FASB. About Us, FAF, 
http://www.accountingfoundation.org/jsp/Foundation/Page/FAFLandingPage&
cid=1175805317591 (last visited Oct. 12, 2015). 
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a strong position to carry out its mission.  
The alignment of the new entity’s mission with that of the 
CFTC would lead to a collaborative, positive relationship be-
tween the two organizations.213 The existence of the NFA, com-
bined with the CFTC’s support, would ease the transition to a 
sole, authoritative rule maker for commodities exchanges.214 
Given the structure of the new entity, Subsection 2 broadly dis-
cusses the type of rules it would promulgate. 
2. Regulatory Focus of the New Entity 
Some have argued that ex-post regulation is more effective 
than ex-ante regulation with regard to preventing market ma-
nipulation.215 “Given the myriad of factors that determine a 
market’s vulnerability” to manipulation, it is difficult to prom-
ulgate ex-ante regulations that properly deter manipulation, as 
“restrictions are frequently more severe than necessary to pre-
vent manipulation and demoralize legitimate uses of mar-
kets.”216 Ex-post deterrence, on the other hand, does not pose 
the same problems. Strict, harm-based sanctions are preferable 
because “the probability of detection of a market power manip-
ulation is very high, and the probability of a mistaken convic-
tion is very small.”217 The exchange can impose substantial fi-
nancial punishments for market manipulation, as would-be 
manipulators likely have vast financial resources.218  
The new regulatory entity for commodities exchanges, 
therefore, would likely have a retrospective focus. Retrospec-
tive-based regulations would deter known types of manipula-
tion from recurring, even though new types of manipulation 
would undoubtedly surface. The key to success would be re-
sponsiveness. If the new entity is to be effective, it must under-
stand the operation of its rules and frequently adjust various 
categories so that they continue to align with the entity’s mis-
 
 213. See supra text accompanying notes 182–84. 
 214. See Karmel, supra note 44, at 427 (“The futures industry could per-
haps move more easily to a sole self-regulator than the securities industry  
. . . .”). The securities industry did largely move to a single self-regulator via 
FINRA. See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text. 
 215. See, e.g., Self-Regulation, supra note 12, at 196–99 (suggesting that 
traders be “subject to penalties if they exploit market power during delivery 
periods,” but less restricted in their actions beforehand); Steven Shavell, The 
Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, 36 J.L. & ECON. 255, 256–66 (1993). 
 216. Self-Regulation, supra note 12, at 196–97. 
 217. Id. at 197.  
 218. See id.; infra note 228 and accompanying text. 
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sion of favoring Hedgers, thus deterring manipulation.219  
Although constant revision of rules entails substantial 
costs, they are preferable to open-ended standards. Rules pro-
vide roadmaps for both compliance as well as the identification 
of noncompliance.220 Courts, for example, are currently poorly 
equipped to deter manipulation because “the existing federal 
statutes that proscribe manipulation are poorly crafted and 
vague.”221 Moreover, broad standards would require both the 
exchange and would-be manipulator to “make a judgment re-
specting a law-to-fact application,” and the “good faith with 
which they apply the principle will be unverifiable ex-post.”222 
Thus, standards would work against the goal of ex-post regula-
tion: to punish those who are later determined to have manipu-
lated the market. Given the expertise and independence of the 
new regulatory entity, it would be able to draft precise and rel-
evant rules, thus giving compliance monitors better roadmaps 
and enhancing the deterrent effect of ex-post sanctions.223 Alt-
hough a structure based on the FASB combined with an em-
phasis on ex-post regulation provides a solid foundation, Sub-
section 3 addresses some of the challenges the new rule 
promulgator will face. 
3. Challenges Facing the New Entity 
The first obstacle would be achieving acceptance of the new 
entity’s rules. Commodities exchanges have maintained their 
market regulation responsibilities and have no apparent reason 
to relinquish them. While the CFTC oversees rulemaking, it 
 
 219. See Bratton, supra note 160, at 40; cf. supra note 72 and accompany-
ing text (noting the LME reacted too late in changing a warehousing rule). The 
NFA could be given monitoring responsibilities in conjunction with the ex-
changes and provide regular feedback to the new regulatory entity. In addi-
tion, the new entity would be open to receiving complaints from traders. None-
theless, some commentators have deemed the regulatory process confusing 
and circular, leading to many dead ends. See Nicholas R. Bednar, Note, Social 
Group Semantics: The Evidentiary Requirements of “Particularity” and “Social 
Distinction” in Pro Se Asylum Adjudications, 100 MINN. L. REV. 353, 392 n.254 
(2015); Maxwell Mensinger, Note, Remodeling “Model Aircraft”: Why Restric-
tive Language That Grounded the Unmanned Industry Should Cease To Gov-
ern It, 100 MINN. L. REV. 405, 430 n.160 (2015). 
 220. See Bratton, supra note 160, at 40–41. 
 221. Self-Regulation, supra note 12, at 198–99 (explaining how the poorly 
crafted laws have led to several legal decisions that allow a manipulator “to 
squeeze a market during the delivery period as long as he does not acquire his 
position with the intent to do so”). 
 222. See Bratton, supra note 160, at 44. 
 223. See Self-Regulation, supra note 12, at 198. 
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owes a degree of deference to the exchanges.224 Thus, some sort 
of legislation would likely be needed to allow the CFTC to des-
ignate the new entity as the recognized rule maker for commod-
ities exchanges.225 Although this may seem like an unlikely 
proposition, it is achievable.226 
A second challenge would be enforcement. Just as auditors 
verify that Preparers properly apply the FASB’s standards, 
commodities exchanges are responsible for monitoring compli-
ance with trading rules. Demutualization potentially incentiv-
izes exchanges to disregard noncompliance. 227  However, ex-
changes can levy fines on firms that violate its rules, thus 
providing a revenue stream.228 Because the new entity would be 
focused on creating rules that allow for ex-post detection of 
manipulation,229 the benefits of stringent enforcement would 
likely outweigh those of permitting noncompliance. The com-
modities exchanges, therefore, would be properly incentivized 
to enforce its public-oriented rules. 
Moreover, the new entity would be required to promulgate 
rules for a vast array of futures products across numerous 
commodities exchanges.230 It would undoubtedly be an ambi-
tious undertaking, but a recent, analogous project shows that it 
is viable. The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board 
(SASB), similarly structured to the FASB, develops and dis-
tributes “sustainability accounting standards that help public 
corporations disclose material, decision-useful information to 
 
 224. See 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(2), (c)(4)(A), (c)(5) (2012) (listing requirements 
for CFTC oversight of exchange rulemaking). 
 225. Cf. supra note 158 and accompanying text (noting the SEC’s recogni-
tion of the FASB). 
 226. See Brush, supra note 18 (“Congress may be forced to pass legislation 
on the issue [of exchange regulation].”). Moreover, the Dodd-Frank Act ex-
panded the CFTC’s authority. See supra text accompanying note 141. 
 227. See, e.g., REP. ON BANK INVOLVEMENT WITH PHYSICAL COMMODITIES, 
supra note 57, at 189–90 (reporting that the LME has the “authority to inves-
tigate” and can “impose additional load-out requirements” on warehouses that 
intentionally create queues, but it has failed to do so). 
 228. See, e.g., Jed Horowitz & Aaron Lucchetti, NYSE Levies Fine Against 
Lehman for Trading Tactic, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 3, 2005), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB113093824717486284; see also About FINRA, supra note 199 (not-
ing FINRA levied $134 million in fines in 2014). But see Macey & Novogrod, 
supra note 200, at 965 (noting FINRA’s “difficulty [in] enforcing its own rules” 
and that it “does not have explicit statutory authorization to bring private 
rights of action in court to enforce the penalties it assesses against members”). 
Thus, the commodities exchanges would likely need to be given explicit au-
thority to collect the fines it levies. 
 229. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 230. However, the entity would not have to start from scratch—it could 
begin by assessing the operation of existing exchange rules. 
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investors.”231 Founded in 2011, the SASB expects to have com-
pleted issuing reporting standards for eighty-eight industries 
across ten economic sectors by early 2016.232 Effective commu-
nication and collaboration between the exchanges, the new 
regulatory entity, and the NFA would smooth the process of 
rule promulgation.233 
Finally, the CFTC heavily defers to the futures industry,234 
and the risk of regulatory capture is ever-present.235 Thus, the 
success of the new FASB-structured regulatory entity for com-
modities exchanges will depend on the organization’s ability to 
stay true to its public-oriented mission as well as attract quali-
fied talent. It must be able to develop the prestige needed to 
draw not only the best and the brightest, but also those in-
clined to perform public service. Adequate funding and public 
awareness of the entity, therefore, will be important issues. 
However, if the FASB is any indication, the creation and sus-
tainability of such an entity for commodities exchanges is both 
feasible and highly desirable.  
  CONCLUSION   
Commodities exchanges are currently SROs with CFTC 
oversight. They are not, however, properly incentivized to deter 
manipulation and promote market efficiency and integrity, as 
they do not fully internalize the costs associated with such ma-
nipulation. Moreover, demutualization of exchanges has exac-
erbated the issue. Shareholders with profit-maximizing incen-
tives may govern the exchange and prioritize earnings or the 
interests of certain shareholders over regulatory norms. With 
 
 231. SUSTAINABLE ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, http://www.sasb.org (last vis-
ited Oct. 12, 2015). 
 232. Michael Peltz, Climate Change and the Years of Investing Dangerous-
ly, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/ 
article/3327752/investors-endowments-and-foundations/climate-change-and 
-the-years-of-investing-dangerously.html.  
 233. See supra note 183. 
 234. See, e.g., supra note 140. While the SEC wields the power to set finan-
cial accounting standards if it is unsatisfied with the FASB’s performance, the 
CFTC does not have the same level of rulemaking authority. For further dis-
cussion, compare supra text accompanying note 184 with supra note 224 and 
accompanying text. 
 235. Regulatory capture refers to “agencies deliver[ing] regulatory benefits 
to well organized political interest groups, which profit at the expense of the 
general, unorganized public.” Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incor-
porating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1998); see also 
text accompanying note 156 (noting the difficulty in finding directors who are 
truly independent). 
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respect to the United States aluminum market, evidence sug-
gests that this potential for manipulation became a reality. 
Through its ownership of Metro warehouses and the LME, 
Goldman Sachs was able to corner the market, thus imposing 
significant costs on other parties. 
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, exchange self-
regulation has its benefits. Exchanges can leverage their indus-
try expertise to adopt rules that enhance efficiency and organi-
zation. SROs are also unencumbered by bureaucratic processes. 
Nevertheless, fundamental reform is needed to concentrate 
commodities exchanges’ rulemaking efforts on the public inter-
est. The creation of a FASB-structured regulatory entity with 
an explicit preference for Hedgers would preserve commodity 
exchange self-regulation but ensure the promulgation of public-
oriented rules. With guidance from the FASB’s blueprint (com-
bined with hard work and a little luck), commodities exchanges 
could transition to a sole, authoritative rule maker that better 
deters manipulation and promotes market integrity and effi-
ciency. 
 
